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The First Anti-Sanctuary Law:
Proposition 187 and the
Transformation of Immigration
Enforcement
Rick Su*
Anti-sanctuary efforts are sweeping the country, as the federal
government and a growing number of states impose stringent restrictions
on the ability of cities and other localities to limit their involvement in
federal immigration enforcement. Many are now wondering how far this
movement will go. But where and how did this movement begin? This Essay
argues that the roots of the contemporary anti-sanctuary movement can be
traced to Proposition 187, a ballot initiative adopted by California voters in
1994. As the nation’s first anti-sanctuary law, Proposition 187 established
the basic provisions featured in nearly every anti-sanctuary measure
enacted since. Moreover, it led the federal government to reshape federal
law and initiatives to enable the kind of federal-local cooperation that
Proposition 187 envisioned. As a result, Proposition 187 did more than
simply set the groundwork for the modern anti-sanctuary movement. It also
led to a restructuring of the federalism relationship that made the
proliferation of anti-sanctuary legislation like Proposition 187 more
necessary. In other words, although Proposition 187 is largely remembered
as a benefit-restricting measure, it is its anti-sanctuary efforts that
constitute its most lasting legacy.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 5, 2017, California enacted SB 54, a “sanctuary” law that
prohibits state and local officials from participating in federal
immigration enforcement.1 Exceptions were provided in certain cases.2
But as only the second state to pass such a measure,3 California was
widely recognized as a vanguard in resisting the federal government’s
escalating interior enforcement efforts. Immigration advocates
immediately lauded the law as a model. The federal government quickly
filed suit to challenge its constitutionality.4 All the while, SB 54 stood
out as a counterpoint to the wave of anti-sanctuary measure sweeping
the country.5 While several states have enacted laws to compel the
participation of local officials in federal immigration enforcement in
recent years, California was now mandating that they refuse.
But if California is now leading the charge on sanctuary, it was also a
pioneer in the anti-sanctuary movement that it now opposes. Indeed, in
the 1990s, long before the political battle over sanctuary policies
dominated the national debate, California enacted the nation’s first antisanctuary law. Local officials were required to “fully cooperate” with
the federal government.6 They were mandated to take affirmative steps
to verify the legal status of immigrants, and report those found
unauthorized to the federal government.7 Local sanctuary policies were
also explicitly prohibited.8 That law was Proposition 187.9 It was
enacted as a ballot initiative in 1994 with the support of nearly sixty
percent of California voters.10 And I argue in this Essay that it reshaped
our nation’s approach to immigration enforcement, and ultimately gave
rise to the sanctuary debates that now dominate immigration politics.

1

See SB 54, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
See id. § 2.
3 Illinois was the first state to pass a statewide sanctuary bill, also in 2017. See
Illinois TRUST Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 805/15 (2017).
4 See United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 876 (9th Cir. 2019).
5 See Pratheepan Gulasekaram et al., Anti-Sanctuary and Immigration Localism, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 837, 839-40 (2019).
6 See Proposition 187: Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification
and Reporting (1994), at § 4(a).
7 See id. § 4(b).
8 See id. § 4(c).
9 See generally id.
10 See BILL JONES, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE, at xxv (1994).
2
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Much has been written about Proposition 187. And despite the fact
that it was never enforced — initially blocked by a court injunction11
and later abandoned by elected officials12 — it has long served as a
cautionary tale. For some, the story is one of political backlash, and
what can happen when the issue of immigration is cast through the lens
of race, criminality, and the welfare state.13 For others, it is an account
of political transition, and how one law tipped a traditionally
Republican state into becoming a Democratic stronghold.14 In both
tellings, the focus is on how Proposition 187 sought to deny
unauthorized immigrants access to the state’s social services, emergency
healthcare, and its public schools and universities.15 What has largely
been overlooked is how Proposition 187 sought to compel state and
local involvement in immigration enforcement, and did so by denying
state and local officials the ability to limit their participation.
This Essay is a reexamination of Proposition 187 as an anti-sanctuary
law. At the most basic level, it shines light on the enforcement mandates
and sanctuary prohibitions that have become common features in
nearly every anti-sanctuary measure that has been adopted since
Proposition 187’s introduction. But more importantly, this Essay argues
that Proposition 187 advanced a new model of immigration
enforcement based on federal-local cooperation. This new model would
eventually be embraced by the federal government, resulting in federal
reforms that both supported and enabled the kind of coordinated
enforcement that Proposition 187 proposed. In doing so, however, the
federal response to Proposition 187 also made laws like Proposition 187
more important to federal immigration enforcement efforts, thus
leading to the wave of anti-sanctuary laws that are now proliferating at
the state level. In other words, although Proposition 187 is largely
remembered as a benefit-restricting measure, it is its anti-sanctuary
efforts that constitute its most lasting legacy.
This Essay is organized in three parts. Part I details the anti-sanctuary
measures of Proposition 187, how they coalesce into a distinct vision of

11 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1261 (C.D.
Cal. 1997).
12 See ROBIN DALE JACOBSON, THE NEW NATIVISM: PROPOSITION 187 AND THE DEBATE
OVER IMMIGRATION xiv (2008).
13 See, e.g., id.; KENT A. ONO & JOHN M. SLOOP, SHIFTING BORDERS: RHETORIC,
IMMIGRATION, AND CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 187 (2002).
14 See, e.g., ANDREW WROE, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND IMMIGRATION POLITICS: FROM
PROPOSITION 187 TO GEORGE W. BUSH (2008).
15 See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition
187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1425 (1995).
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federal-local cooperation, and how this vision led to its downfall in
federal court. The goal here is to cast Proposition 187 in a new light,
and to suggest the radical manner in which its drafters sought to reshape
immigration policies at both the federal and local levels. Part II
describes Proposition 187’s legacy. The state law may have been
enjoined because it sought to advance a broad vision of how federal
immigration enforcement should be carried out. But it was precisely this
vision of coordinated enforcement that was ultimately adopted into
federal law. Part III explores Proposition 187’s impact on today’s
sanctuary and anti-sanctuary debates. It argues that the reason these
debates have escalated to the forefront of immigration politics is because
the vision of immigration enforcement that Proposition 187 set forward
cannot be effectuated through federal law alone; it requires
complementary policies at the state and local levels. As long as federal
immigration policies revolve around the type of federal-local
cooperation that Proposition 187 introduced, states and localities will
continue to be embroiled in the broader immigration debates.
I.

PROPOSITION 187 AS AN ANTI-SANCTUARY LAW

A. The Anti-Sanctuary Provisions of Proposition 187
That Proposition 187 was intended as an anti-sanctuary measure
should not be surprising given its text. Commentators have long
emphasized the law’s attempt to “prevent illegal aliens in the United
States from receiving benefits or public services.”16 But as the preamble
made clear, the goal was also “to provide for cooperation between the[]
agencies of state and local government with the federal government, and
to establish a system of required notification by and between such
agencies.”17 In other words, Proposition 187 was about more than the
relationship between immigrants and the state. It was also an attempt
to redefine the relationship of state and local officials with federal
immigration authorities.
Indeed, the goal of federal-local cooperation extends well beyond the
statement of purpose in the preamble; it was written right into the
substantive provisions of Proposition 187 itself. Like many state antisanctuary laws that have been enacted since, Proposition 187 contains
a broad cooperation mandate. Section 4, for examples, begins by stating
that “[e]very law enforcement agency in California shall fully cooperate
16 Proposition 187: Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification and
Reporting (1994), at § 1.
17 Id.
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with the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service” with
respect to individuals under arrest and suspected of being in the country
without legal authorization.18 What this “full cooperation” entails, or
what kind of enforcement activities would be required, is not explicitly
set out. But this appears to have been precisely the point. Given its
open-ended language, law enforcement officials would be required to
participate in any federal immigration initiative in which their
participation is requested, and presumably in any manner desired by
federal authorities.
Aside from a broad mandate to cooperate, Proposition 187 also sets
out a number of specific activities that state and local officials must do
to support federal immigration enforcement efforts. These include
verification, reporting, and notification mandates, all of which are
required regardless of whether participation is requested by the federal
government. Under Section 4(b), law enforcement officials are required
to verify the immigration status of anyone under arrest if there is any
suspicion that they are present in violation of federal immigration
laws.19 If an immigrant is identified as unauthorized through this
verification process, Section 4(b) further requires state and local
officials to report the “apparent illegal status” to federal immigration
authorities and the state’s Attorney General, along with “any additional
information that may be requested.”20 In addition, a separate
notification requirement instructs law enforcement officials to
specifically tell unauthorized immigrants to “obtain legal status or leave
the United States.”21 It is worth noting that Proposition 187 did not limit
these mandates to local law enforcement officials. Indeed, Sections 5
through 7 extends the verification, reporting, and notification
requirements to the state state’s social service administrators, healthcare
providers, and educators.22
Last, Proposition 187 bans what we would now refer to as sanctuary
policies. Of course, the cooperation, verification, and reporting
requirements described above already restricts the ability of local
governments to limit their participation in federal immigration
enforcement. But Proposition 187 also explicitly bans policies to that
effect. Section 4(c) states that any “legislative, administrative, or other
action by a city, county, or other legally authorized local government

18
19
20
21
22

Id. § 4(a).
See id. § 4(b)(1).
Id. § 4(b)(3).
Id. § 4(b)(2).
See id. §§ 5(c), 6(c), 7(d).
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entity . . . to prevent or limit the cooperation required by [the
cooperation mandate] is expressly prohibited.”23
What is striking about these provisions is how they operate
independent of the benefit-restricting measures that were touted as the
core of Proposition 187. To be sure, at the time that Proposition 187
was introduced, these anti-sanctuary provisions were largely described
as the means by which benefit-restrictions can be meaningfully
enforced. It was argued that only by verifying legal status can California
ensure that governmental benefits like social services, healthcare, or
public education are not used by unauthorized immigrants. But even if
this is how these provisions were justified, it is clear that they also stand
on their own. Benefits can be denied without requiring law enforcement
to “fully cooperate” with federal immigration officials. Local law
enforcement officials provide no direct governmental “benefit” that
would require them to first verify the immigration status of those they
arrest. Nor is it clear that local sanctuary policies, especially those
enacted in order to conserve local resources for local priorities, cannot
operate in tandem with a state policy that denies benefits to
unauthorized immigrants.
Understanding Proposition 187 as an anti-sanctuary measure also
explains why these provisions continue to be copied by the wave of antisanctuary legislation now sweeping the country more than two decades
later. Few states are now seeking to restrict benefits to unauthorized
immigrants (in part because the federal government has imposed far
more sweeping legislation to that effect). But Proposition 187’s antisanctuary provisions have only spread. Cooperation mandates have not
only become commonplace, but are also increasingly more open-ended.
An anti-sanctuary law enacted by Alabama in 2015, for example,
requires law enforcement officials to both “fully comply with and . . .
support the enforcement of federal [immigration] law . . . .”24 The same
can be said of Proposition 187’s verification and reporting requirements.
In fact, the reason why SB 1070 — the infamous anti-immigration
measure enacted by Arizona in 2010 — was dubbed the “show me your
papers” law25 was because it requires law enforcement officials to
independently verify the immigration status of anyone they encounter
in a “lawful stop, detention or arrest,” and report illegal status to the
federal government.26 Moreover, sanctuary bans are now an
23

See id. § 4(c).
ALA. CODE § 31-13-5(b) (2019).
25 See, e.g., DORIS MARIE PROVINE ET AL., POLICING IMMIGRANTS: LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT ON THE FRONT LINES 1 (2016).
26 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2019).
24
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increasingly common feature of state law. And although the scope of
contemporary sanctuary bans has grown,27 the bans themselves all build
upon the basic framework set forth by Proposition 187.
In short, Proposition 187 is, at heart, an anti-sanctuary law. It is an
anti-sanctuary law because it seeks to eliminate local discretion over
how and in what circumstances local communities wish to participate
in federal immigration enforcement. And it does so not only by
imposing a broad mandate to cooperate with the federal government,
but also through specific requirements to assume many of the duties of
federal authorities. This is not to say that the benefit-restricting
provisions of Proposition 187 are not important. After all, it was these
provisions that proponents of Proposition 187 touted, and which
persuaded many California voters. But the manner in which the benefit
restrictions were to be carried out were also tied to a separate goal of
promoting an immigration enforcement regime encompassing all levels
of the federal system.
B. Reimagining Immigration Enforcement
Proposition 187, I have argued, established the basic framework for
the kind of anti-sanctuary laws that have proliferated since its
enactment. But the significance of Proposition 187 is not just as an antisanctuary law, or even the nation’s first. It is also because Proposition
187 sought to fundamentally reshape how immigration laws are
enforced and how policies concerning enforcement are made. First,
Proposition 187 imagined a system of complementary enforcement in
which state and local officials could be used to greatly expand the
enforcement capabilities of the federal government. Federal-local
cooperation, rather than exclusive federal authority, would serve as
basic structural framework for our nation’s immigration enforcement
system. Second, Proposition 187 advanced a vision of immigration
policymaking in which states, and not just the federal government,
27 Proposition 187 sought to ban sanctuary policies that limit federal-local
cooperation with respect to immigrants under arrest. Indiana and Virginia, however,
now prohibit any policies that restrict the involvement of government officials to
anything “less than the full extent permitted by federal law.” See IND. CODE § 5-2-18.24 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1409 (2019) (emphasis added). Proposition 187
targeted sanctuary effectuated through “legislative, administrative and other actions.”
Contemporary sanctuary bans are increasingly drafted to cover far more, including
“patterns and practice[s],” “informal, unwritten polic[ies],” and “procedures and
customs.” See S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (codified in TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 752.053(a)(1) (2019)); IOWA CODE § 825.1 (2018); H.B. 9, 2018 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. § 2 (Fla. 2018).
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would play a central role. After all, if it is through federal-local
cooperation that immigration enforcement can be expanded, then states
are well-positioned to mediate that relationship.
These ideas may now seem commonplace. But it is important to keep
in mind how radical they might have appeared at the time that
Proposition 187 was introduced. We take it as a given today that
expansive immigration enforcement depends on the participation of
state and local actors. But in the 1990s, federal-local cooperation with
respect to immigration was just starting to be considered. There was
little consensus on the legality of state and local officials participating
in immigration enforcement.28 There were even less agreement on
whether they should. This is not to say that federal-local cooperation
was entirely absent. A number of pilot programs had been developing
since the late 1980s, many of which involved law enforcement agencies
in California.29 Local officials also reported immigrants to federal
authorities on an ad hoc basis.30 But as a matter of federal law and
policy, there were no national programs that formally integrated state
and local officials into federal enforcement efforts. Nor was there a
national system available that would allow local officials to take part in
identifying or removing unauthorized immigrants.
This is likely why Proposition 187’s requirement to “fully cooperate”
with the federal government was written in such a broad and openended manner. Efforts to compel or encourage federal-local cooperation
today tend to refer explicitly to participation in an existing federal
program, like compliance with federal detainers or participation in
287(g) agreements.31 But without any program or policy to refer to, the
drafters of Proposition 187 needed to anticipate the range of formal
28 See Nancy Cervantes et al., Hate Unleashed: Los Angeles in the Aftermath of
Proposition 187, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 7 (1995); Paula Sue Smith, An Argument
Against Mandatory Reporting of Undocumented Immigrants by State Officials, 29 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 147, 154-55 (1995).
29 See, e.g., The Impact of Federal Immigration Policy and INS Activities on
Communities Before the Information, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture Subcommittee
of the Committee on Government Operations House of Representatives, 103d Cong. 319-34
(1994) (testimony of G.H. Kleinknecht, Associate Commissioner of Enforcement,
Immigration and Naturalization Service); Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing
Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367,
422-33 (1999).
30 See, e.g., Patrick J. McDonnell, Police Fear Prop. 187 Will Crush Hard-Earned
Trust, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 1994, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm1994-11-05-mn-58755-story.html [https://perma.cc/42VG-6DE6] (“During the 1992
riots, the LAPD turned over hundreds of suspected illegal immigrants to the INS.”).
31 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-42-102 (2019) (regarding federal detainers); id.
§ 7-68-105 (regarding 287(g) agreements).
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programs that might be developed and the different kinds of federal
request that might be made. And they did so by essentially giving the
federal government an open-ended invitation to conscript the state’s law
enforcement officials as they see fit.
But the drafters of Proposition 187 were also not content to simply
anticipate the development of federal immigration policies that might
call upon state or local participation. They wanted to advance federallocal cooperation as a central operating principle, and to do so directly
from the state level. As a result, Proposition 187 also needed to address
the possibility that such a model of immigration enforcement might be
forestalled by federal reluctance or local opposition. Even if the state’s
personnel are entrusted to the federal government, there was no
guarantee that they will be fully or effectively utilized. Moreover, given
that the vast majority of the state’s governmental officials are under the
direct control of cities and counties,32 any effort to commandeer them
on the federal government’s behalf would have to overcome local
policies that deny their participation. After all, coordinated action in
our federal system is in many cases a three-way street. A ballot initiative
like Proposition 187 can bind the state. But to implement a model of
federal-local cooperation, the law also needed to overcome possible
resistance both above and below.
To that end, Proposition 187 goes further than simply requiring “full
cooperation” by state and local officials. To overcome federal
reluctance, it imposes verification and notification requirements that
effectively orders state and local officials to act as immigration
enforcement agents, and a reporting requirement that seeks to compel
the federal government to follow the state’s lead. If the federal
government chooses not to use state and local officials to identify
unauthorized immigrants, Proposition 187 requires them to take steps
to identify on their own. States and local governments may not have the
constitutional authority to deport unauthorized immigrants on their
own, but those immigrants can still be driven to “self-deport”33 when
state and local officials instruct them to “obtain legal status or leave the

32 See, e.g., LISA JESSIE & MARY TARLETON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 CENSUS OF
GOVERNMENTS: EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY REPORT 2-3 (2014), https://www2.census.gov/
govs/apes/2012_summary_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4L3P-WRJP].
33 Indeed, this was how then-Governor Pete Wilson described the intended effect
of Proposition 187’s benefit restrictions as well. See William Safire, Opinion, SelfDeportation?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at A15. For earlier state efforts to encourage
“self-deportation,” see DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 218 (2007).
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United States.”34 All the while, the reporting requirement allows
California to maintain political pressure on the federal government to
“do their job.” Proposition 187 cannot directly compel the federal
government to deport unauthorized immigrants that state and local
officials identify. But federal authorities might nevertheless be spurred
into taking action, which appears to be what the verification and
reporting requirements aimed to do.
Having addressed the relationship between the federal government
and the state, Proposition 187 turns to the thorny issue of the state’s
own local governments. Local sanctuary policies were relatively rare at
the time. But the few that existed were a major concern for the law’s
sponsors. Years before Proposition 187 was proposed, one of its key
supporters openly criticized sanctuary policies like Special Order 40 in
Los Angeles.35 And during the campaign for Proposition 187, a
spokesperson for one of its organizational sponsors argued that “[i]t’s
cities like San Francisco,” which had “declared itself a sanctuary for
illegal immigrants . . . that make referendums like [this] necessary.”36
As a result, Proposition 187 wields the power that states exercised over
their localities to compel their participation. Section 4(c) specifically
preempts any “city, county, or other legally authorized local government
entity” from “prevent[ing] or limit[ing]” the “fully cooperate” mandate
contained in Section 4(a).37 Moreover, the preemption applies to
“legislative, administration, or other actions” that may be taken by a
local government or its officials.38 In other words, Proposition 187
limits the discretion that local governments have traditionally enjoyed
with respect to directing the activities of their officials, or setting the
law enforcement priorities for their communities. And to the extent
local governments implement policies limiting the circumstances when
or manner in which local officials may check the immigration status of
immigrants they encounter, those policies are preempted by Proposition
187’s verification and reporting requirements.

34 Proposition 187: Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification and
Reporting (1994), § 4(b)(2).
35 See Mary Ann Milbourn, Sanctuary Resolution ‘Ridiculous,’ INS Says, DAILY NEWS
L.A., Nov. 27, 1985, at 1; see also Harold W. Ezell, Blow to INS Bashers, MERCURY NEWS,
May 20, 1987, at 15B (criticizing the church-led sanctuary movement).
36 Mi Young Pae, S.F. Panel Opposes Prop. 187, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13, 1994, at A17.
37 Proposition 187: Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification and
Reporting (1994), at § 4(c).
38 Id.
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C. The Legal Challenge Against Proposition 187
Proposition 187 was not just an anti-sanctuary law. As the nation’s
first, it was also intended to fundamentally reshape the baseline
presumption with respect to how immigration responsibilities should
be allocated among the various levels of our federal system. This, I have
argued, is why Proposition 187 was a radical proposal at the time that it
was introduced. Yet it was also this “reimagining” of our nation’s
response to illegal immigration that led to its downfall. In League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson,39 District Court Judge Pfaelzer
enjoined major parts of Proposition 187 for infringing on the federal
government’s plenary power over immigration, and thus violating the
Constitution’s supremacy clause. The problem was not that Proposition
187 directly conflicted with any provision of federal law. Rather, it was
that the initiative’s effort to fundamentally reshape how immigration
enforcement was carried out ran afoul of the federal government’s
exclusive authority to establish its own immigration enforcement policy.
Indeed, despite all the attention paid to Proposition 187’s benefit
restrictions, nearly every one of these provisions survived the initial
rounds of legal challenges. Drawing upon De Canas v. Bica,40 in which
the United States Supreme Court explained that not “every state
enactment which in any ways deals with aliens is a regulation of
immigration and thus per se preempted,” Judge Pfaelzer held that
California had the right to withhold the state’s own resources from
unauthorized immigrants. And even if the “denial of benefits . . . may
indirectly or incidentally affect immigration by causing such persons to
leave the state or deterring them from entering California in the first
place, such a denial does not amount to a ‘determination of who should
or should not be admitted in the country,’”41 which remains a sphere of
exclusive federal authority. As a result, California was permitted to deny
social services, state-funded healthcare, and even post-secondary public
education to unauthorized immigrants. The only benefit that could not
be denied was primary and secondary education, which the Supreme
Court had recognized as a right of all children in Plyler v. Doe.42 But that
injunction was expected; it was intended all along that Proposition 187

39 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal.
1995).
40 424 U.S. 351 (1975).
41 Wilson, 908 F. Supp. at 770 (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355).
42 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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was to be used as a vehicle to compel the Court to reconsider its holding
in Plyler.43
Where Proposition 187 ran into trouble was with respect to its antisanctuary provisions, and more specifically the cooperation,
verification, and reporting mandates. Of course, concerns about these
provisions were extensively raised during the political campaign leading
up to the vote on the ballot initiative. Critics argued that it would lead
to the establishment of a “police state” in California.44 They feared that
with little to go on, state and local officials will rely on racial profiling
in deciding when Proposition 187’s verification requirement needed to
be implemented.45 And these criticisms came not only from immigrant
advocates, but also from federal and local officials. Doris Meissner,
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
questioned the use of the police in immigration enforcement operations,
while Attorney General Janet Reno argued that “[i]t does not make
sense to turn schoolteachers and nurses into Border Patrol agents.”46
Local officials from across the state issued public statements against
Proposition 187 as well,47 with some police departments going as far as
to suggest that they might refuse to comply with its enforcement
mandates entirely.48
But for Judge Pfaelzer, it was ultimately the novel vision of federal
immigration enforcement underlying Proposition 187 that ran afoul of
constitutional constraints. Taken on their own, none of the antisanctuary provisions were explicitly preempted by federal law. Yet taken
as a whole, Judge Pfaelzer concluded that they constituted a
“comprehensive scheme to detect and report the presence and effect the
removal of illegal aliens.”49 This California could not do. By requiring
state and local officials to make an independent determination of an
individual’s immigration status, the court explained, California was
infringing upon powers that the Constitution and Congress “exclusively
reserved” for federal officials.50 The only context where state and local

43

See, e.g., WROE, supra note 14, at 80.
See, e.g., ONO & SLOOP, supra note 13, at 83-84.
45 See, e.g., John SW Park, Note, Race Discourse and Proposition 187, 2 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 175, 184 (1996).
46 Id.
47 See WROE, supra note 14, at 71-73; Patrick J. McDonnell, L.A. Police Panel Joins
Foes of Measure, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1994, at B4.
48 See Park, supra note 45, at 185.
49 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 769 (C.D. Cal.
1995).
50 Id. at 770.
44
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verification would be permitted, according to the court, was in the
limited cases where a federal program for immigration status
verification already existed. Nor was it permissible for Proposition 187
to deny those “suspected” or “reasonable suspected” of being
unauthorized from receiving governmental benefits. As Judge Pfaelzer
explained, the “reasonably suspects” language effectively creates a
separate category of immigrants distinct from those that have been
actually determined to be in this country illegally; only Congress can
create new immigration categories in this manner.51
Contrary to conventional accounts then, Proposition 187 did not fail
constitutional scrutiny because it sought to deny benefits to
unauthorized immigrants. The voters who enacted Proposition 187 may
have been motivated by its benefit-restricting measures. But it was its
anti-sanctuary provisions that were deemed unconstitutional, and more
specifically because they coalesced into a “comprehensive scheme” of
federal-local cooperation over immigration.
II.

THE ANTI-SANCTUARY LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 187

More than an effort to deny governmental benefits to unauthorized
immigrants, I have argued that Proposition 187’s goal was also to
effectuate a model of immigration enforcement based on federal-local
cooperation. It was this effort to create a “comprehensive scheme” for
the identification, reporting, and removal of unauthorized immigrants
that led to Proposition 187’s downfall. Yet, as I argue here, it was also
this “comprehensive scheme” that proved to be Proposition 187’s most
lasting legacy.
This Part describes how federal law and policy were transformed in
response to Proposition 187. The ballot initiative’s influence can be seen
in the comprehensive immigration reforms adopted by Congress in
1996. Its vision also underlies many of the enforcement initiatives that
were developed by the federal government in the years following
Proposition 187’s introduction. My claim here is not just that the federal
government copied Proposition 187’s anti-sanctuary provisions into
federal law. It is also that subsequent federal reforms paralleled,
supported, and complemented state laws like Proposition 187. As a
result, instead of displacing state anti-sanctuary efforts, the federal
response to Proposition 187 made the proliferation of laws like it even
more necessary.

51

See id. at 779.
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A. Reshaping Federal Law
Proposition 187’s influence on federal law can most readily be seen in
the comprehensive immigration reforms adopted by Congress in 1996.
That year, alongside landmark reforms to the criminal justice system,52
Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibilities Act (“IIRIRA”)53 and the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”).54 Like Proposition
187, IIRIRA was an effort to curtail illegal immigration. Congress also
made clear its intent to “remove the incentive for illegal immigration
provided by the availability of public benefits”55 through restriction
imposed by PRWORA. And politically, Proposition 187 figured
prominently in the enactment of both laws. In congressional hearing
and floor debates, the “lesson” of Proposition 187 was endlessly invoked
as a justification for drastic federal action on immigration.
The many ways that IIRIRA reformed federal immigration law is
beyond the scope of this Essay. For our purposes here, what stands out
is the extent to which Congress embraced the cooperative vision of
immigration enforcement that Proposition 187 set out. IIRIRA laid the
legal foundations at the federal level for implementing the kinds of
cooperation, verification, and reporting activities that Proposition 187
sought to carry out at the state level. It did so by making it clear that
federal law now welcomed local participation, thus removing the legal
constraints that led to Proposition 187’s injunction. In various
provisions of IIRIRA, Congress also created a federal “interface” that
addressed many of the administrative challenges that state and local
officials faced if Proposition 187 was to be enforced. In other words, if
California extended an invitation to the federal government to
undertake a new era of federal-local collaboration over immigration,
Congress accepted that invitation in 1996 by meeting the state halfway.
Indeed, what is remarkable about IIRIRA is the degree to which it
complements Proposition 187 by specifically addressing its legal
limitations and administrative shortfalls. If one of the reasons
Proposition 187 was enjoined was because immigration enforcement is

52 See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
53 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
54 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
55 Id. § 400, 110 Stat. at 2260.
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a power that is “exclusively reserved” in the federal government,56
Congress made clear its ability and desire to delegate that authority.
Adding section 287(g) to the Immigration and Naturalization Act,
IIRIRA created a process by which the federal government could train
and deputize state and local officials as federal immigration agents.57
Deputization under this section requires a formal agreement between
the federal government and a law enforcement agency. But having done
so, state and local law enforcement officials are not only provided the
legal authority to act as federal officials, but also resources previously
available only to federal immigration authorities.
Through IIRIRA, Congress also responded to concerns that
Proposition 187’s enforcement mandates were impractical because state
and local officials lacked the training and resources to identify
unauthorized immigrants on their own. To that end, IIRIRA established
a formal process by which state and local officials can count on federal
assistance in verifying immigration status. In fact, Congress explicitly
made such assistance mandatory on the federal government itself,
limiting the discretion ordinarily exercised by administration officials.
Section 1373 states that federal immigration authorities “shall respond
to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to
verify . . . [the] immigration status of any individual . . . by providing
the requested verification or status information.”58 To carry out this
mandate, the federal government established the Law Enforcement
Support Center, which provides “immigration status, identity
information, and real-time assistance to local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies . . . 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a
year.”59 In this respect, Section 1373 of IIRIRA is a mirror image of
56 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 770 (C.D.
Cal. 1995).
57 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2019).
58 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2019). Congress also made clear that no formal agreement
on the employee of a state or local government to “communicate” or “otherwise to
cooperate” with the federal government in immigration enforcement matters, including
the “reporting . . . identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not
lawfully present in the United States.” Id. § 1357(g).
59 Law Enforcement Support Center, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T,
https://www.ice.gov/lesc (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/PKM7-STZD].
Although IIRIRA created the mandate that led to the implementation of this system, the
system itself had been proposed by federal officials long before then. See The Impact of
Federal Immigration Policy and INS Activities on Communities: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Info., Justice, Transp., & Agric. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 103d
Cong. 30 (1993-1994) (discussing “an initiative which came out of the 1986 Anti-Drug
Abuse Act and which Attorney General Barr approved in the final months of his
administration and that is, INS has proposed to establish a criminal alien tracking center
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Proposition 187’s cooperation mandate. If Proposition 187 conscripts
state and local officials on behalf of the federal government, IIRIRA
conscripts federal officials on behalf of the state and local governments.
Lastly, Congress, too, felt it necessary to address the prospect that law
enforcement officials, largely under the control and supervision of local
governments, might be constrained by local policies. To that end, the
1996 reforms included a ban on local sanctuary policies that both
mirrored and went beyond the one included in Proposition 187. Section
1373 prohibits any policies that “prohibit, or in any way restrict, any
governmental entity or official from sending to, or receiving from”
federal immigration authorities immigration-related information. In
addition, no policies can restrict any official from “maintaining such
information,” or “exchanging such information with any other Federal,
State, or local government entity.”60 That Congress did not require
verification and reporting directly makes sense, given that such
mandates would likely run afoul of the Supreme Court’s anticommandeering doctrine, which forbids the federal government from
directly conscripting state and local officials to implement federal
laws.61 But Congress tried to reach a similar outcome by prohibiting
state and local officials from enacting policies that would limit such
cooperation.62 And despite being upheld by a federal court shortly after
it was enacted,63 some courts are now holding that Section 1373’s anti-

that would operate 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year; it would be for the
specific purpose of providing a response to queries from State and local police
concerning a suspected alien, aggravated felon, or narcotic offender in custody”).
60 8 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (2019).
61 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 943 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992). In these two cases, the Supreme Court held that the
Tenth Amendment and federalism principles of the Constitution barred the federal
government from commandeering the state legislative process, or conscripting state and
local officials from carrying out federal programs.
62 There were also signs that some members of Congress wanted to go further to
compel state and local participation in immigration enforcement. At the time that
IIRIRA was considered, there were efforts to give the federal anti-sanctuary ban more
teeth by conditioning federal grants on state and local cooperation in immigration
enforcement. See, e.g., Proposals for Immigration Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration & Refugee Affairs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 45-46 (1994).
These early proposals mirror the defunding efforts of the Trump administration in
recent years. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (2017).
63 See City of N.Y. v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1999).
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sanctuary provision may run still afoul of the anti-commandeering rule
that Congress tried to avoid after all.64
Proposition 187 may have never been enforced, but as this Section
illustrates, its goals carried over into federal law. Congress adopted many
of Proposition 187’s anti-sanctuary provisions that were struck down as
preempted. More importantly, Congress embraced the vision of federallocal cooperation that Proposition 187 outlined, and explicitly enabled
many of the collaborative pathways that it sought to create. The
connection is not coincidental. As the legislative records surrounding
IIRIRA reveal, congressional representatives had California’s ballot
initiative in mind when they wrote and debated the 1996 reforms. And
that influence persists today. We may still be debating the wisdom of
conscripting local law enforcement officials into federal immigration
enforcement efforts. That debate, however, is now framed almost entirely
around the model that Proposition 187 introduced, and the specific
manner in which it had influenced the development of federal law.
B. Reshaping Federal Enforcement
If one legacy of Proposition 187 is in federal law, another is in the
various “operations” developed by federal immigration authorities.
Recall that one of the most expansive provisions of Proposition 187 was
its requirement that state and local government officials “fully
cooperate” with federal immigration enforcement efforts. I noted that at
the time it was enacted, it was difficult to define what such cooperation
entailed because there were no established formal programs integrating
local officials into federal immigration enforcement efforts. That quickly
changed, however, in the years following Proposition 187’s enactment
and the 1996 immigration reforms.
Indeed, nearly every major interior enforcement initiative since 2000
has been designed with federal-local collaboration in mind. Operation
Community Shield, for example, expanded existing anti-gang task
forces consisting of federal, state, and local officials to specifically target
immigrant gangs by leveraging criminal and civil immigration laws.65
Since 2005, such task forces have carried out a number of neighborhood
raids and sweeps that have picked up criminal immigrants alongside

64 See City of Chi. v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 866-73 (N.D. Ill. 2018); City of
Phila. v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 329-31 (E.D. Pa. 2018); County of Santa Clara
v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1215-16 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
65 See Jennifer M. Chacon, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the
“Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 327-29 (2007).
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those who were simply present in the United States without
authorization.
Operation Secure Communities, initiated in 2008, instituted an even
closer and more enduring link between local law enforcement and
federal immigration officials. Launched at first as a voluntary program,
jail and prison officials were provided the opportunity to submit the
fingerprints of immigrants to the federal government to cross-check
against known immigration violators.66 This greatly expanded the
ability of the federal government to detect unauthorized immigrants by
screening those who come into contact with local law enforcement.
Many communities were initially eager to participate in Secure
Communities, especially as a way of identifying unauthorized
immigrants who had been arrested for serious and violent crimes. But
when it was announced that Secure Communities would no longer be a
voluntary program, and that all fingerprints processed through the FBI’s
database would be shared with immigration officials, many
communities voiced their opposition.67 This led Secure Communities to
be formally suspended during the later years of the Obama
administration, though the practice of cross-checking fingerprints still
persisted.68 Soon after his inauguration, President Trump formally
reinstated Secure Communities.69
But the operational logistics of Secure Communities also led to other
programs that required further local involvement. One such program is
the issuance of federal detainers. Having flagged a suspected
unauthorized immigrant through Secure Communities or other means,
federal officials needed a way to ensure that individual could be
transferred into federal custody. To do that, it was often necessary for
local law enforcement officials to keep that individual in their custody
until such a transfer can actually take place. As a result, the federal
66 See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 228 (2016); Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State
Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities After Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13,
23 (2016).
67 See Julia Preston, Despite Opposition, Immigration Agency to Expand Fingerprint
Program, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/12/us/ice-toexpand-secure-communities-program-in-mass-and-ny.html [https://perma.cc/MK7HRYS9].
68 See ANGELA S. GARCÍA, LEGAL PASSING: NAVIGATING UNDOCUMENTED LIFE AND
LOCAL IMMIGRATION LAW 103 (2019).
69 See Farah Stockman & J. David Goodman, Trump Immigration Policies Pose Conflict
for Police in ‘Sanctuary Cities,’ N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/02/24/us/sanctuary-city-trump-immigration-detainers.html [https://perma.cc/3C9Q2DL7].
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government began issuing “detainers” instructing local law enforcement
officials to hold a particular individual for up to forty-eight hours after
the time they would ordinarily be released from state custody.70 Further,
the federal government began demanding access to state and local
facilities in order to assume custody of a suspected individual or to
conduct further investigations.71 Though detainers have now been
legally construed by courts as mere “requests” that state or local
governments can choose to honor or ignore,72 many state and local
officials initially considered them to be binding obligations.
Proposition 187’s vision of expanding immigration enforcement
through local participation was realized in large part by the
implementation of Secure Communities. Not only did a formal program
now exist whereby the “full cooperation” requirement is given form, but
reporting and verification by local officials was both automated and
difficult to avoid given how central the FBI fingerprint database has
become to everyday law enforcement activities. Indeed, when it comes
to interior enforcement, the federal government is now almost entirely
reliant on local involvement in effectuating removals. In recent years,
the Secure Communities program itself has contributed to the removal
of more than 80% of all immigrants deported from the nation’s interior.73
Not only has this greatly expanded the interior enforcement capabilities
of federal immigration enforcement, as the sponsors of Proposition 187
wanted, but it has also allowed the federal government to outsource
much of its costs. When Proposition 187 was proposed, budget analysts
predicted that its verification and reporting requirements might cost
tens of millions on an ongoing basis, and perhaps more than 100 million
in the first year.74 Though Secure Communities and detainers involve
70

See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2019).
See, e.g., City of Chi. v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 278-79 (7th Cir. 2018)
(describing federal effort to condition federal grant on being granted access to state and
local facilities for immigration enforcement purposes).
72 See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F. 3d 634, 640-41 (3d Cir. 2014).
73 Interior deportation numbers decreased from 2012 to 2017, but the share of those
connected to the Secure Communities program increased. In 2015, for example, out of
69,478 deportations from the interior, 60,105 were identified through the Secure
Communities program (86.5%). In 2017, out of 81,603 interior deportations, 67,792
were identified through Secure Communities (83%). In contrast, less than half of
interior deportations were connected to Secure Communities in 2012 (83,578 out of
180,970). See Deportations Under ICE’s Secure Communities Program, TRAC REP. (Apr.
25, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/509/ [https://perma.cc/P3G7-SN7Y].
74 See Proposition 187: Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification
and Reporting. Initiative Statute: Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney
General (1994), available at https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2103&context=ca_ballot_props [https://perma.cc/YEP6-UCNF].
71
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only law enforcement officials, recent estimates peg the cost to state and
local governments in California alone to be approximately $65 million
a year.75
Perhaps even more important than how federal operations and
initiatives have reshaped immigration enforcement, however, is how
they have reshaped the political rhetoric around the role of states and
localities. When Proposition 187 was enacted, the thought of formally
incorporating states and local officials into federal immigration
enforcement was perceived as extraordinary. It was precisely because it
would be extraordinary that the sponsors of Proposition 187 pushed it
as a ballot initiative in California, and urged it as a model for other
states. But since then, federal-local participation is widely considered to
be the default baseline — a basic and necessary component of our
nation’s immigration enforcement strategy. And this view has prevailed
despite the fact that the federal government’s ability to mandate local
participation in federal immigration enforcement is constitutionally
limited.76 In contrast, it is now the cities and counties seeking to
extricate themselves from immigration that are viewed as extraordinary.
Moreover, this view is increasingly shared by not only the critics of local
sanctuary policies, but also its supporters. Again, if Proposition 187 was
radical for offering a new model of federal immigration enforcement, it
is worth noting how that radical vision has become the accepted norm.
C. Reshaping State Involvement
As noted earlier, the anti-sanctuary torch of Proposition 187 is now
carried by other states. In the past several years, waves of anti-sanctuary
legislation have been enacted at the state level. In their basic structure,
they continue to mirror that of Proposition 187, from the broad
cooperation requirement and specific mandates to the ban on local
sanctuary policies. Yet recent state anti-sanctuary laws have also gone
further, especially with regards to the rise of punitive provisions that
dramatically increase the penalties for localities and officials that fail to
comply.
This is not to say that Proposition 187 did not spur other states to act
in its immediate aftermath. A wave of copycat legislation arose on the
75 See CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, THE COST OF STATE & LOCAL
INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 3 (2014) [https://perma.cc/ZS9N-GKG5];
JUDITH A. GREENE, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, THE COST OF RESPONDING TO IMMIGRATION
DETAINERS IN CALIFORNIA (2012), https://www.justicestrategies.org/publications/2012/
cost-responding-immigration-detainers-california [https://perma.cc/A257-EESH].
76 See, e.g., City of Chi. v Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 280 (7th Cir. 2018); County of
Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 525-26 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
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heels of Proposition 187’s enactment. Arizona, Florida, and New York
proposed legislation that copied its “fully cooperate” provision.77
Similar reporting and verification mandates were proposed in
Minnesota, Virginia, and Oregon.78 Legislators in New York introduced
a bill prohibiting local sanctuary policies mirroring the one in
Proposition 187.79 In states that provided for ballot initiatives, similar
grassroots efforts emerged. None of these efforts, however, proved
successful. Perhaps public support outside of California was not as
strong. Perhaps the legal challenges that Proposition 187 faced deterred
lawmakers in other states. Or perhaps political energy was redirected
towards federal reform efforts that would eventually culminate in
IIRIRA.
But starting in the late 2000s, state anti-sanctuary laws proliferated,
and their enactment follows the federal developments described above.
As federal reliance on local participation increased in the mid- to late2000s, more and more local governments chafed against the new
demands and began adopting sanctuary policies to limit their
involvement. As sanctuary policies became more common and begun to
attract national attention, states stepped in to ban them and mandate
participation. Oklahoma and Missouri passed anti-sanctuary legislation
in 2007 and 2008 respectively.80 Arizona’s SB 1070 was enacted in
2010.81 Alabama followed with similar legislation a year later.82 And in
recent years, states like Texas, Tennessee, and Florida have joined the
wave.83 And like Proposition 187, these laws are based around the idea
that states needed to take the lead once again — not only to compel
more federal enforcement, but also to foreclose local opposition.
Given these developments, it is worth reflecting on the degree to
which contemporary anti-sanctuary measures make sense precisely
because Proposition 187’s success in reshaping federal law and
enforcement policies. If Proposition 187’s cooperation mandate seemed
broad and perhaps vague in its requirements, similar mandates are now

77 See S.B. 262, 1995 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1995); S.B. 1043, 42d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 1996); A.B. 9113, 219th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995).
78 See H.B. 1268, 1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (1996 Va.); H.B. 249, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Minn. 1995); H.B. 2933, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1995).
79 See A.B. 9112, 219th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995).
80 See H.B 1804, 52st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ok. 2007); H.B. 1549, 1771, 1395, & 2366,
94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).
81 See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Az. 2010).
82 See H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Al. 2011).
83 See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 752.053(a)(1) (2017); S.B. 168, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2019); H.B. 2315, 110th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018).
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largely understood to refer to specific federal initiatives like detainer
requests and established task forces. If questions were initially raised
about the ability of state and local officials to comply with Proposition
187’s verification and reporting requirements, those concerns are now
largely alleviated by the availability of federal assistance in verifying
immigration status, and the establishment of a federal infrastructure to
receive and act on local reporting.
Moreover, reforms to federal law and policies have largely addressed
the legal concerns that initially led to Proposition 187’s injunction.
Through IIRIRA, Congress made clear that state and local participation
neither conflicted with nor frustrated the federal scheme of immigration
enforcement; rather, such participation was explicitly welcomed and
encouraged. Thus, when the Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of Arizona’s SB 1070, it specifically referred to the 1996
immigration reforms in upholding anti-sanctuary provisions that
mirrored those enjoined in Proposition 187.84 Thus, if anti-sanctuary
laws are now proliferating, it is because they are precisely the kind of
state laws that the federal government sought to encourage in the
aftermath of Proposition 187.
Indeed, in many cases, state anti-sanctuary laws today seem
specifically designed to overcome the legal limits that federal antisanctuary efforts have faced. Because the federal government cannot
directly commandeer state and local officials to carry out federal
immigration enforcement, states are needed to do so on its behalf. As
the Trump administration has struggled to defund sanctuary cities by
denying them federal grants, states are stepping in with even more
defunding punitive measures that would deny all state aid. And while
the federal government’s anti-sanctuary efforts have been stalled by legal
challenges, state anti-sanctuary measures like SB 4 in Texas have
escaped relatively unscathed.85 It would appear today that the heart of
the anti-sanctuary movement is once again centered over states, much
like it was at the time that Proposition 187 was enacted.
And with that, it appears that the vision of federal-local cooperation
that Proposition 187 proposed for immigration enforcement has also
become the model for anti-sanctuary legislation. Through Proposition
187, California prompted and encouraged complementary antisanctuary legislation at the federal level in order for laws like
Proposition 187 to work. The enactment of those complementary

84

Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 413-15 (2012).
See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 180 (5th Cir. 2018) (upholding SB
4 from federal preemption challenges, among others).
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legislation at the federal level in turn spurred more states to pursue more
anti-sanctuary measures — not only because they are more effective as
a result of these federal reforms, but also because state laws became
more necessary in order to fill the gaps that federal law cannot reach.
This too, then, is the legacy of Proposition 187.
III. PROPOSITION 187 AND THE SANCTUARY / ANTI-SANCTUARY DEBATE
Proposition 187 was not only the nation’s first immigration law, but
was also responsible for the vision of federal-local cooperation that has
become the centerpiece of our nation’s approach to immigration
enforcement. This is perhaps Proposition 187’s most lasting legacy,
reflected not only in the development of federal and state laws, but also
the sanctuary/anti-sanctuary framing that now dominates the
immigration debates. This Part offers further reflections on how this
legacy has shaped the contemporary debate over sanctuary and antisanctuary policies. In addition, it comments on how the “success” of
Proposition 187 has influenced the nature of immigration advocacy,
both in favor and against increased interior enforcement.
A. The Continuing Role of States
First, Proposition 187 solidified the role of states in federal
immigration policymaking. For immigration advocates, it demonstrated
the efficacy of using states as a platform to influence federal policies.
More importantly, the cooperative model of immigration enforcement
that Proposition 187 pushed, and which the federal government
embraced, further amplified the role of states in the development of
federal enforcement strategies. As the federal government became more
reliant on state and local participation in immigration enforcement,
state governments effectively became permanent partners in federal
enforcement programs. As a result, this reliance created a political
environment in which states wield an outsized influence on the ability
of the federal government to expand immigration enforcement efforts
in the nation’s interior.
Of course, none of this is to say that Proposition 187 was unique in
its influence on federal policy. Since the beginning of federal
immigration regulations in the late nineteenth century, state laws have
served as templates for federal laws.86 Indeed, Proposition 187 wasn’t
even the first California law to play this role. California’s efforts to
restrict and expel Chinese immigrants served as the template for federal
86

Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1359 (2013).
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restrictions on contract laborers, prostitutes, and eventually the nation’s
first race-based immigration ban.87 In the early twentieth century,
California pioneered the use of “alienage” regulations that limited the
governmental rights and privileges of non-citizens, which led to similar
restrictions at the federal level.88 And just two decades before
Proposition 187 was enacted, California passed an employer restriction
law targeting unauthorized immigrants. This law was not only upheld
by the Supreme Court,89 but went on to become one of the centerpieces
of the 1986 federal immigration overhaul. From this perspective, much
of the nation’s immigration policies — from the Chinese Exclusion Act
to employer verifications — can be directly tied to laws and policies
enacted first in California.
Even in this historical context, however, Proposition 187 stands out.
And not simply because of the widespread national attention that it
garnered, but also because of the governmental relationship that it
formed between the federal, state, and local governments in the federal
system. Earlier state laws on immigration were deemed successful if
they were eventually replicated and replaced by federal law. Thus, when
the federal government enacted employer restrictions in the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,90 Congress explicitly
preempted any similar laws at the state level, including the California
law that it copied.91
The federal response to Proposition 187, however, did not seek to
displace state and local officials, or state laws, in the same way. Rather,
the cooperative framework that arose was premised on state and local
participation, and of the kind that Proposition 187 sought to mandate.
In other words, unlike previous state laws on immigration, the federal
adoption of Proposition 187 as an enforcement model did not render
state anti-sanctuary laws like Proposition 187 superfluous and
unnecessary. Instead, it made them more important. For the cooperative
model to work, it was not only necessary for laws like Proposition 187
to exist, but also that it spreads to all of the other states.
This explains why even as federal attention to immigration
enforcement has grown in recent decades, state and local regulations
concerning immigration have expanded as well. California voters may
have enacted Proposition 187 in order to send a message to the federal
87

See id. at 1361.
See id. at 1360.
89 See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 365 (1975).
90 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
91 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2019).
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government about the need for immigration enforcement.92 But one
effect of the federal response is that every state and locality is now forced
to develop policies on their willingness to dedicate resources to
immigration enforcement, even those that would otherwise refrain from
involving themselves in immigration policymaking altogether. In turn,
states and localities have become more crucial as sites for immigration
advocacy. Proposition 187 itself was propelled to victory in part because
of the support that it drew from former federal immigration officials and
national advocacy organizations.93 California provided a platform for
these officials and organizations to steer the national immigration
debates after traditional federal forums were closed off. And given the
success of Proposition 187 as a political strategy, and the manner in its
success decentralized immigration policymaking, it makes sense that
immigration advocates have since turned their attention beyond the
federal government. To contest the perceived inadequacies of the
Obama administration’s immigration policies, enforcement advocates
turned to states like Arizona to advance their position.94 To challenge
the Trump administration’s enforcement excesses, immigrant advocates
turned to states like California and Illinois, and cities like San Francisco
and Chicago.95
Indeed, it is worth reflecting on how Proposition 187 has changed the
political rhetoric surrounding immigration. At the time it was enacted,
sanctuary policies hardly figured in the national debate over
immigration. In fact, the term “sanctuary” was not even widely used to
describe policies that limited states and localities participation in
immigration enforcement. One reason for this was that state and local
cooperation in this federal responsibility was seen largely as
discretionary — something helpful, but not part of the regulatory
baseline when it came to immigration. But after Proposition 187 and the
1996 federal reforms, state and local participation was recast in the
public’s eye as expected, if not required. The jurisdictions that limited
their involvement in some way, however limited, became the outlier.
Those that duly cooperated with all demands of the federal government,
and in much the same way that Proposition 187 sought to mandate with
its broad “cooperation” mandate, were understood to be the norm.
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Hence the “sanctuary” label attached to policies in which states and
localities limited their participation, despite the fact that such policies
provide unauthorized immigrants no refuge from federal officials.96 It is
also why the sanctuary/anti-sanctuary controversy is now considered
central to our nation’s immigration debate.
B. Constraining the Role of Localities
One legacy of Proposition 187 is an expansion of the governmental
arenas in which immigration policies are made. Yet it can also be argued
that Proposition 187 pushed in the opposite direction as well:
narrowing the scope of potential immigration policymakers by
constraining the role of localities. This is not to say that the sponsors of
Proposition 187 sought to cut local governments out of immigration
entirely. If anything, the model of immigration enforcement that they
endorsed was one in which local officials would play an expanded role.
But Proposition 187 rested on the concept that local participation could
be compelled without local support. Instead, the state could mandate it
directly. In other words, if local officials were central to the expansion
of federal immigration enforcement, it would be the state that serves as
their broker.97
Ironically, at the time that Proposition 187 was being considered,
California localities were already actively cooperating with the federal
government on immigration enforcement. For proponents of
Proposition 187, early sanctuary policies like those in Los Angeles and
San Francisco loomed large. But as noted earlier, in the years before
Proposition 187’s enactment, the federal government had fostered a
strong working relationship with city and county law enforcement
officials in the state, including their participation in several federal pilot
programs that were eventually expanded nation-wide. Nor were local
sanctuary policies as restrictive as critics made them out to be. For
example, Special Order 40 in Los Angeles permitted local involvement

96 The “sanctuary” label was first used to refer to the church-led movement to insulate,
quite physically, Central American refugees from deportation in the 1970s and 1980s. See
generally SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, THE CULTURE OF PROTEST: RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM AND THE U.S.
SANCTUARY MOVEMENT (1993). Besides the religious and historic connections, “sanctuary”
made sense there because the churches were seeking to block federal officials from
apprehending unauthorized immigrants in their care, as they are once again doing today.
See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Immigrant Shielded From Deportation by Philadelphia Church
Walks Free, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/us/sanctuarychurch-immigration-philadelphia.html [https://perma.cc/ME63-CBQK].
97 See supra Part I.B.
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in immigration enforcement in a large number of situations.98 Through
their participation in federal pilot programs, and in circumstances
permitted by existing sanctuary policies, localities in California were
cooperating with federal officials. Yet, in both of these cases, it was the
localities themselves — motivated by local concerns and guided by the
interests of their local constituency — that decided the manner and
circumstances in which local resources would be allocated to
immigration enforcement. It was local officials that negotiated those
terms with federal officials. Proposition 187 then did not simply seek to
insert states into immigration policymaking, it also sought to insert
states into this federal-local relationship. In other words, Proposition
187 aimed to sever the federal-local relationship that had been building
with respect to immigration enforcement in California and substitute a
federal-state relationship in its stead.
Moreover, by insisting that states play a role in brokering the federallocal relationship, Proposition 187 offered the federal government a
partial solution to one of the biggest obstacles in implementing a
cooperative model of immigration enforcement. Given that the vast
majority of law enforcement officials in the country are employed by
local governments like cities and counties, it is these local officials that
hold the greatest promise for expanding federal immigration
enforcement efforts. But because of this patchwork system of law
enforcement, the federal government faces the daunting task of having
to negotiate with each and every police or sheriff’s department
individually. The best they can hope for is a patchwork system of
cooperation across the country. It would be easier if the federal
government could simply mandate local participation in immigration
enforcement through its plenary power over immigration. However, the
Constitution and our system of federalism also prevents it from
commandeering local officials directly. The federal government could
substantially increase the number of immigration agents that operate
within the nation’s interior. But such an expansion would be at great
cost, and would still pale in comparison to more than 470,000 sworn
officers that serve in local police departments and sheriff’s offices.99

98 See Los Angeles, Cal., Special Order No. 40 (Nov. 27, 1979) (allowing for
reporting of unauthorized immigrants if they have been “booked for multiple
misdemeanor offenses, a high grade misdemeanor or a felony offense, or [have] been
previously arrested for a similar offense”).
99 See BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013:
PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 1 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
lpd13ppp.pdf [https://perma.cc/JTA7-F9JV].
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Instead of negotiating with local governments and law enforcement
agencies directly, however, Proposition 187 suggested that states can
mandate local participation on the federal government’s behalf. At the
very least, states can forbid local policies that would limit their
participation. After all, local governments are traditionally understood
in American law as creatures of the state.100 And if the federalism
principles of the Constitution forbids the federal government from
“commandeering” local officials as subsidiaries of the sovereign states,
no such federal constitutional principles protect local officials from
commandeering by their own state.101 To be sure, state commandeering
is no substitute for uniform federal mandates. But negotiating with 50
states is far easier than dealing with the nearly 90,000 local governments
and more than 17,000 state and local law enforcement agencies across
the United States.102
That states might have a strong interest in brokering the participation
of their local government is not surprising. What is surprising, however,
is that this form of state intervention began in California. To be sure, as
“creatures of the state,” local governments have long been understood
to be especially vulnerable to state regulation and preemption. But
California was not only one of the many states that had amended its
constitution to grant “home rule” to their local governments at the turn
of the twentieth century, but also adopted a particularly strong form that
prohibited the state from interfering with “municipal affairs.”103 Indeed,
just two years before Proposition 187 was proposed, the California
Supreme Court struck down a state law prohibiting public financing of
local candidates because it was an interference into municipal affairs.
Few state constitutions, and even fewer state courts, have gone as far as
California’s in protecting localities from state control, especially when it
comes to their “sole right to regulate, control, and govern their internal
conduct independent of [state] laws.”104 Yet through Proposition 187,
California also became the first state to directly dictate the duties of local
government officials with respect to immigration, and prohibit local
governments from regulating, controlling, and governing their officials
through local policies. Given the demographic and politics shifts at the
100
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time, it may not be surprising that California led the charge on
immigration. But given its constitutional structure and precedents on
state-local relations, it is surprising that it did so in such a manner.
Interestingly, localities in California did not raise “home rule”
concerns in opposition to Proposition 187. This is not to say that local
opposition to Proposition 187 were absent. Indeed, local governments
and officials were some of the fiercest critics of the law, and many
participated in the litigation against the state.105 Moreover, local
governments and officials raised a host of local concerns with respect to
Proposition 187’s enforcement mandate — erosion of community trust,
burden on local resources, harm to immigrant neighborhoods106 —
many of which have become commonplace arguments in support of
local sanctuary policies. But what was missing in the initial response
was any legal assertion that Proposition 187 unconstitutionally
interfered with local matters by undermining the authority that local
governments and their constituents exercised over their officials.
Perhaps local officials did not believe that “home rule” would be a
winning argument, even in a state like California. Perhaps they believed
that immigration, a national issue, would be construed by courts as
more of a matter of statewide concern, rather than a municipal affair.
Perhaps local officials did not feel such an argument was necessary given
the more promising federal constitutional claims against Proposition
187. In any event, the precedent that localities in California established
in response to Proposition 187 still largely holds. Even as similar antisanctuary laws have been enacted in other “home rule” states, there has
been little effort by localities to challenge these measures as an
infringement of local control.
Ironically, it is against SB 54, California’s sanctuary law, that home rule
arguments are now being raised. As a matter of policy, Proposition 187
and SB 54 cannot be more different. Instead of mandating local
cooperation with federal authorities, SB 54 prohibits it. Instead of
requiring local actions to be taken with respect to unauthorized
immigrants, SB 54 bans it. Instead of preempting local sanctuary
policies, SB 54 establishes such a policy for the entire state. But what SB
54 and Proposition 187 share is that they both seek to eliminate local
discretion with respect to immigration enforcement by mandating
specific local actions (or inaction) and preempting countervailing local
policies. In response, the City of Huntington Beach is suing the state on

105

See WROE, supra note 14, at 71-73.
See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, LAPD Passes on Immigration – Commission Spurns,
DAILY NEWS L.A. (CA), June 25, 1994, at N4.
106

2020]

The First Anti-Sanctuary Law

2013

the ground that SB 54 unconstitutionally intrudes on their home rule
powers to govern municipal affairs. It is far too early to know how this
litigation will end. Yet a district court judge has already issued a
preliminary injunction against the application of SB 54 to the city.107
CONCLUSION
It has been over twenty-five years since Proposition 187 was adopted
by California voters. At the time it was enacted, its enforcement
provisions were widely seen as a radical attempt to decentralize our
nation’s system of immigration enforcement. But had it been enacted
today, it would have found an immigration system that not only
supports the kind of state and local participation that it sought to
effectuate, but also increasingly demands it as a matter of federal law
and policy. Federal-local cooperation is now welcomed and encouraged.
Institutional structures now exist to facilitate local verification and
reporting. Sanctuary is now explicitly denounced as an obstacle to
federal enforcement.
It would be easy, of course, to say that Proposition 187 was simply
ahead of its time. But as this Essay has argued, it was Proposition 187
itself that was responsible for the transformation that followed. As the
nation’s first anti-sanctuary law, Proposition 187 cast the mold for the
anti-sanctuary laws that proliferated in its wake. By proposing a model
of state and local participation, it highlighted the kinds of federal
reforms that would be needed to complement similar state efforts going
forward. Indeed, unlike other state immigration laws that have shaped
federal law and policies, Proposition 187 led to the creation of a federal
system that would require continued action by states to conscript local
officials on the federal government’s behalf. In this regard, Proposition
187 ensured continued state involvement in the development of
immigration law and policy.
Given the degree to which federal immigration enforcement efforts
have become dependent on state and local participation, it is unlikely
that states and localities will be disentangled from immigration
policymaking in the foreseeable future. The federal government plenary
power over immigration will increasingly be tied up with politics at the
state and local level. The flip side, however, is that avenues for effective
advocacy in the immigration arena is decentralized as well. Just as
107 See Priscella Vega, Judge Rules for Huntington Beach in its Challenge to State’s
‘Sanctuary’ Immigration Law, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018, 7:35 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/socal/daily-pilot/news/tn-dpt-me-sb54-hearing-20180927story.html [https://perma.cc/H9BR-43BZ].
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Proposition 187 was effective in shaping federal immigration policy, so
might laws like SB 54. Only time will tell what the next twenty-five years
might bring.

